

ELECTION EDITION.

WALES after the WAR

BY
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FOREWORD.

The following pages are a translation by Mr. R. E. Jones, B.A., Conway, of my Welsh pamphlet, "Cymru Wedi'r Rhyfel." The pamphlet appeared as articles in *Baner ac Amserau Cymru* between November 1941 and May, 1942. It is an argument for using the present powers of the Welsh Local Authorities in order to defend Welsh industry and rebuild Welsh economy after the war. It is on these lines, I believe, that bureaucratic control and Fascist totalitarianism can be prevented after this war in Wales.

S.L.

1.—THE NAZI WORLD.

IF Mr. Winston Churchill were asked, unofficially, to what end he desires to lead this war, it is quite likely that his answer would be: to return to the historical situation that existed in Europe before the rise of Hitler. After the 1914—18 war the rulers and leaders of England insisted on a return to the pre-war situation; they insisted on resurrecting the 19th century with the political, international and economic features that characterised that century. The certain proof of this was England's desire to re-establish her money on the gold standard of the 19th century, and it will be remembered that Mr. Winston Churchill was the very man to achieve his aim. It is unlikely that any other member of consequence in Mr. Churchill's present Government wishes to return to Nineteenth Century Liberalism. Nor is it likely that Mr. Churchill, if still living, will continue in such ways of thought during the period after the war. There will be no return to the Liberalism of the last century. Let us look at England and the countries which are under her rule today. If by glancing at the state and tendencies of our day, we may at all draw any lessons for the future, we may venture to foresee at least this: whoever wins this war, if either side achieve indisputable victory, such a victory we may venture to state will be a victory for Nazism.

The society of the future will be a Nazi society. Some corners of the continent may escape this fate, Ireland, perhaps, and Portugal; it would be splendid if we could say Wales too, but that depends on the success of the Nationalist movement in Wales and there is no certainty that success will come in time to save Wales. But the victory of Nazism in the foremost nations and the most industrialised countries in Europe seems inevitable. War and the demands of war have firmly enthroned Nazism in the British Isles, and the Germans are bearing Nazism to all parts of the Continent. There will be no turning back. For a strong reason. Men no longer have faith in the things which are being left behind. They do not believe in going back. Notice the speeches of the socialists, Morrison, Attlee or Bevin. They all speak of planning a golden future; they speak of the future as a thing that can be planned, and of order and planning as the highest necessities. Very good. Of such is the essence of Nazism. Society a thing to be planned anew, to be organised, to be put together like a complicated machine, and then to be set in motion, improved and perfected. This is the characteristic feature of revolutionary thought in politics. That was the revolution in Russia. It is part of Marxist thought, part of all Socialism. And now Socialism is triumphant. It is in the Totalitarian State that the faith of the majority now lies. We have repeatedly declared that the roots of Hitler's movements are Marxist.

Nazism succeeded in Germany by winning the allegiance of the masses, the industrial proletariat. Every German historian, Nazi or anti-Nazi, agreed on this point. From the first Nazism was a movement of the "Left,"—to use a term which has become a commonplace,—and is considered as such in Germany.

The reader may have noticed that the important books on the social and political crisis of today, the books which are penetrating and go to the depths of the problem, are written by Germans. Such a book is Peter Druker's "The End of Economic Man." Other valuable works are Dr. Hermann Rauschning's books. He left London for the United States this week, soon after the publication of the English version of his latest book, "Making and Breaking with the Nazis." It is a book filled with stimulating lessons. Dr. Rauschning is a Prussian farmer, member of an old family of farmers, and he gives us a portrait of the genuine Prussian Junker, the sober farmers, of moderate wealth, working industriously on their farms, simple in their habits, Puritanical and pious Lutherans, the heirs of strong family traditions—a portrait that should do much to remove the impression given by the pictures drawn by the English popular press and by pamphleteers such as Lord Vansittart. Dr. Rauschning also pays a good deal of attention to the growth and success of Nazism. He shows how the middle and professional classes were destroyed after the last war, leaving Germany a nation of a huge proletariat. No battle between "Left" and "Right" took place in Germany. What happened there was a race, a struggle among the different movements of the "Left," and the movement which triumphed was the movement which attached its socialism and promise of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to another idea, also important, that of a nation and country—National-Socialism.

There are some of you English, says Rauschning, who looking at the atrocities of Germany today, attribute everything to the teaching and propaganda of Hitler. How can you seriously believe such folly? Do you seriously believe that alone enough to account for the hold of Nazism? Rather:—

"For two hundred years, we have been making the 'free' man. For ninety years, the 'materialist interpretation of history' has been preached to the masses of Germany, and wholly materialist ideals have been praised, and that was called progress. For three generations, the 'Left' in Germany has openly strived to destroy Christianity. Do they now desire to deny the harvest? It is their own harvest.

"Not one of those who were considered in Germany during the last hundred years as liberal, progressive and socialist can deny responsibility for the new German. It has been the boast of those amongst us who considered themselves to be 'progressive' to throw overboard every tradition as stuff fit only for the old-fashioned men from the woods."

Then Dr. Rauschning shows how this grew under the Weimar Republic—how Christianity was kept out of the schools and the whole educational system so that only strengthening the boast of Reason and ignoring the foundations of character remained in the system. Therefore all outstanding German literature of necessity inclined to the "Left"—analytical, destructively critical, a field for "the intelligentsia." It resulted in uncultured intellectuals, inhuman Humanism, while the results of war and financial penalties and inflation embittered and hardened hearts.

Dr. Rauschning has a word for Dr. Bruening:—

"Since the war, we have had two politicians of exceptional ability, Stresemann and Rathenau. But we have had only one statesman of undoubted greatness since the days of Bismarck. He is Bruening . . . He is the only one whose shoulders are broad enough today to bear the terrible responsibility of the regeneration of Germany."

But Bruening never had a chance. While he grappled with Germany's problems in 1929, the Wall Street panic spread to Europe, and in the end put Hitler in power. Rauschning shows how great the influence of Marxism has been on all the Leftist movements in Germany since the war. But in addition to this, the Germans were near enough to Russia to see the development of a new system and a new state. What was attempted there might be called government by technicians. Such is the nature of dictatorship. The political parties had been liquidated. There remained only the one party. There was neither opportunity nor freedom for political argument. Only problems of organisation could be discussed, the technique of an industrial society, as the mechanic discusses the problem of his machine. The mechanic became the ideal and pattern of the "new man" in Russia. The Germans studied the lesson diligently. It appealed to them. Organization is a part of their tradition. How much more effectively would they do the job, if they were given the chance! Said Hitler in his latest speech: "Not even our enemies can deny our ability to organise." And it was as a problem for the organisers that they regarded their crisis. Political arguments were meaningless when millions were unemployed, trade at a standstill and docks empty. Thus, the panic of 1929 and the growing crisis that followed, led Germany to accept the principle of the One Party and the One Leader in 1933. Everything else had lost its meaning for the multitudes of industrial unemployed and to the young among the intelligentsia. Every responsible writer who has come into fairly close contact with Hitler emphasises the fact that the attraction he has for the youth of Germany lies in his freedom from tradition, from prejudice, and from convention of all kinds. History does not weigh, and has no hold upon him. He is the leader because he is the new man, the emancipated man, the product of

European Radicalism, the product of progress by revolution. The atrocities of Germany? The same as Russia's atrocities. Once you come to regard social problems as a technician's problem, a problem for the planner and the organiser, once you content yourself with that aim, once you cease to have any heed for history or for men's spiritual traditions, then it is possible for you to allow three million kulaks of the Ukraine to die of famine in order to ensure that modern industrial collectivised farming shall operate with ease as a gigantic unit or factory. Nor do we imagine that Russia and Germany are the only countries where such things can happen. At the present time the destruction of the Welsh community in South Wales is being organised, this also in cold blood. Rauschnig makes a comment which it would be well for us, too, to remember:

"A state of social services must also, of necessity, end in a form of Totalitarian State."

Nothing in politics could be more true, and it would profit us to think long and deeply over that sentence. Has not the praise and extension of "social services" formed the main occupation of our politicians for years?

Dr. Rauschnig is a Lutheran Protestant. He has a paragraph of praise for Stalin, which, however unexpected, is wholly consistent with his point of view. He sees in Stalin the statesman who prevented a second revolution, and thus made possible in Russia a gradual and promising progress and development. He is bold enough to look forward (he wrote his book before the war in Russia started) to the time when Christianity in Russia will be revived and when the Russians will return to the mystic religion of Dostoiewsky. As for Germany, it was Providence, he maintains, that kept Hitler from attempting to win or corrupt the great Christian Churches there, but made him rather to persecute Christianity as a thing irreconcilable with Nazism and the Totalitarian State. And this not only because Christianity denies the State's right to take education completely into its own hands and to form the whole mind and spirit of the child; and not only because Christianity denies that the problem of human society is merely a problem of planning and organisation. But Christianity maintains that original sin is an historical fact, and that therefore some limit to man's ability to improve social life on earth is inevitable; that endless progress is a vain dream; that the best possible human order will be the secondary and indirect result of seeking the justice of God on earth, and not something to be won by setting it up as the chief or sole purpose of life under a Secular State. The chief enemy of Nazism, now and in the future, will be Christianity.

On this point Rauschnig has a remark which deserves our consideration. "I hope," he says, "that Christianity will not become fashionable." He means that he hopes that Christianity will not be made use of, that it will not be boosted and given prominence, merely in order to supplant and defeat Nazism. We hear a great deal of talk these days in England, and by now in Wales, of bringing back Christian education to the schools. What is the object? At last we are beginning to shudder at the effects of secular education. It has been realised that worldly education, which does not include the principles of morality, can turn round and destroy society. That is true enough; and that is the experience of France, and Germany also. But Christians should remember that we have no right to Christianity. Christianity is not ours to do as we please with. Christianity was not given to men for the purpose of creating obedient and moral citizens, easily tamed and easily ruled by the State of Social Services. We have no right to demand the restoration of Christian education in the schools, in order to make safe our bank accounts. There is only one sufficient reason why we should claim for the school-child a Christian education, which is that the child's parents are convinced that Christianity is true. If it is true, then the child is not first and foremost a citizen of the future, but a citizen of another world, with its immeasurably more important claims than the claims of anything in this world. If that is true, then education for another world comes first and is of most importance. It should come before all other education, and should colour and control all other education. Christian education consists of the teaching of the nature of man, of the purpose of his creation, and of the way to achieve that purpose. Christian education will return effectively to the schools when the community itself returns to a belief, a genuine belief, in the teaching of Christianity. In the Nazi world, which is now opening, and which perhaps, will last a long time, Christianity is destined to be despised, and, ultimately, to be persecuted. While the Churches are prepared to serve the State, and lend their aid to the State's propaganda, all will be well. While the Churches are content to leave the State alone, and to refrain from cutting across the State's demands, they will be left undisturbed and receive official approval. But the day is coming in countries nearer home than Germany, when it will be easy to know the Christians, for they will be few, and they will be hated. They will be poor, and they will demand their own schools. The marks of the prison will be upon them, and in their hands will be the key of the world's freedom.

The point of view adopted in these articles is that the victory of Nazism in this war is almost certain. Perhaps Mr. Churchill may succeed in defeating Germany—he is a man of great faith—and if so he will also cast Hitler and his government down from

their throne. But there is no hope that by so doing he will dethrone Nazism, either in England or in Europe. For at present there is nothing which can be put in the place of Nazism. It is no longer a choice between Nazism and Liberalism, but between Nazism and anarchy. And it is not by revolution that Nazism will be destroyed but by patiently and laboriously building up new ideals in small communities and some small countries. Men will have to develop anew, and, at first, on a small scale, new communities in the shadow of the industrialism of the modern State. And that is a task that cannot be accomplished without a faith, as strong as the faith of the Nazis. But a different faith.

2.—ENGLAND'S PLAN AND THE POLICY OF EXPORTS.

ON May 12 the President of the Board of Trade appointed a committee of important English industrialists to discuss and plan for the development of export trade after the war. The appointment of such a committee is in itself an act of confidence and faith; it presupposes an English victory at the end of the war. Its appointment also confirms our judgement as to the tendencies and policy of the Government of Great Britain in regard to the post-war period.

There appeared, in *The Times*, on May 13, a special article as well as a leading article on this policy, both of which also corroborated our conclusions, and greeted the Export's Committee's appointment as a particularly important step at the present time.

The leading article says:—

No major country derives, or probably ever has derived, so large a proportion of its wealth directly or indirectly from overseas trade; no major country depends to so large an extent on overseas trade for the maintenance of a dense population and a high standard of living. . . . Yet it must be regarded as certain that a substantial falling off in the overseas trade of this country would be reflected in falling standards of living.

That is the general theory. Then comes the lesson for the period which is to follow the victorious conclusion of the war:—

"But if a serious contraction of trade and a serious fall in the standard of living are to be avoided, British exports must not merely be maintained at their old level but raised above it at a time when productive capacity of the whole world has been stimulated by the war, and when every country will be straining to regain or retain its position in world markets."

It would be as well, perhaps, to show that all the authorities in England are unanimous as to the necessity of this programme. We could quote many witnesses on this point, but content ourselves with two about whose authority there can be no question. Said Sir Kingsley Wood in his Budget speech last month:

"There is no need to take a pessimistic outlook on our prospects after the war. The essential condition of our success is the regaining of our foreign markets; our main purpose will be to increase international trade as much as possible. There is no country to which this will be more essential than our country."

And now let us turn to the brilliant economist whose influence on the Exchequer's policy is said to be strong. Sir J. M. Keynes said in a radio address on March 30:

"Immediately after the war, our export industries must have the first claim on our attention. I cannot place too great an emphasis on this.

"Until we have restored our export trade to its previous status, we must be ready to endure any reasonable sacrifice for the sake of our exports. Success in that sphere is the basis of success in every other sphere."

These points can be summarised as follows: All the authorities agree

- (1) That British foreign trade must be restored at least to its pre-war volume.
- (2) That new difficulties will hinder the realization of this project.
- (3) Its realization, however, is so essential, that all "reasonable sacrifices" can be justified in order to attain it.
- (4) Unless its realization is achieved then disaster in the shape of a "serious lowering of the standard of living" is unavoidable.

Let us consider the difficulties. The more obvious of these are conveniently summarised in *The Times'* special article of May 13:—

"In the 1930's the annual gap between the visible imports and exports of Great Britain rose to more than £400,000,000. This gap was filled first by shipping, financial and other services rendered to overseas countries; secondly by revenue from overseas investments, and thirdly to the extent of something like £50,000,000 a year latterly by the sale of investments or other overseas assets.

"After the war the third of these services will be no longer available; the second will have sunk to small proportions—if indeed our indebtedness to other countries does not actually exceed their indebtedness to us; and the first will according to all reasonable prognostications, have substantially diminished."

And here is another paragraph which goes further and speaks more plainly than either Keynes or Kingsley Wood had dared to do:—

"Without attempting the impossible feat of predicting what the position will be at the end of the war, the best qualified judges are convinced that in order to pay for imports on the pre-war scale, visible exports would have to be approximately *doubled*, and they are agreed that nothing like this can be achieved without great changes both in our industrial structure and in our trading methods. Nor will such changes suffice unless we can at the same time secure the co-operation of foreign governments and foreign industries in raising the standard of living in the countries with which we trade, and in bringing some kind of order into the scramble for markets."

Let us summarise once more so as to make the matter clear:—

- (1) It will be necessary to double the pre-war yearly exports of Great Britain.
- (2) That will mean "great (internal) changes."
- (3) Even then, success is impossible unless two conditions are realised:—
 - (a) that there shall be no international competition for markets;
 - (b) that a policy of co-operation with Britain be followed by the countries with which she trades.

The task set for Britain by the experts already appears formidable. We shall consider in a moment what is meant by "the great (internal) changes" and what is implied in Keynes' phrase, "to endure any reasonable sacrifice for the sake of our exports." But we have not yet finished with the difficulties. It will be remembered that the late Phillip Snowden, the Socialist Chancellor of the Exchequer, once explained, when unemployment in Lancashire was at its height, that the problem could be settled and prosperity immediately restored to that distressed area, if only the people of China could be persuaded to lengthen their shirts by only three inches. Where, we may well ask, will longer shirts be sold after this war? As the war spreads, machinery, industries and factories have also spread over the world in belligerent as well as neutral countries. The world will not again consist of a small group of highly-industrialised countries and a large group of agricultural countries having no industries. Every country that can will aim at establishing a balance between industry and agriculture, and will depend less and less on foreign trade. In short, it will not be possible, at any rate during the remainder of the twentieth century, for international trade to regain the same proportion or the same share of human activity as was given to it in the nineteenth century. The sum total of international trade will be very much smaller. America, Japan, the British Dominions, Russia and the European countries will all demand their share; the number of competitors for this diminished market will be greater than ever before; and yet the authorities declare that in

order to maintain Great Britain's standard of living her share of this diminished market must be **doubled**. And Keynes asserts that "success in that sphere is the basis of success in every other sphere." In plain words: failure means disaster and chaos—even though the war be won. The situation which would arise should the war not be won is not considered.

Up to now the authorities have been very chary of explaining the "great changes" in domestic arrangements, implicit in the post-war trade policy. Nor has Keynes vouchsafed any explanation of "to endure any reasonable sacrifice for the sake of our exports." One or two hints, however, have been given. For instance, members of the Government have emphasised recently that the existing arrangement of state control of production, and of buying and selling, will have to be continued in the period after the war. Again, in *The Times*' special article of May 13, the following hint is given:—

"It is recognised today by everybody that the old, easy, days are over; that in the new conditions, some of the old staple exports, such as coal, the coarser grades of cotton textiles, heavy iron and steel, cannot hope to regain their former volume; that to redress the balance, we must rely upon new industries; that if the consumer abroad will no longer take what we were accustomed to produce, we must find out what he will take and how we can best supply it; and finally that this cannot be carried out by individual firms, but will need co-operation both between all the firms in each industry and between different industries under some form of state guidance."

The wording is cautious, but the meaning is by no means ambiguous; the domestic and industrial arrangements outlined in the above paragraph imply a sort of National-Socialism on the 1935-1939 German pattern. And it is fair to admit that nothing else is possible, if the policy unanimously advocated for Great Britain by all the English authorities up to now, is adopted,—namely, the policy of "enduring any reasonable sacrifice" in order to restore—or double—exports.

And here, from the same article, is another suggestion, which also reveals one of the perplexing problems that will face the state-planners:—

"Something perhaps may be done to ease the problem by reducing our imports. In addition to essential foodstuffs and raw materials we bought in the past from foreign countries many luxuries which we can well do without, at any rate until we have made certain of being able to pay for the things we really need But it would be unwise to count on any great relief from this source. Any serious reduction in the volume of imports would be impossible without a substantial lowering of the standard of life in this country; and it would incidentally further impoverish some of our prospective customers At the same time it is well to be clear that, as a matter, not of policy, but of sheer necessity, we shall have to confine our buying within our means of payment and shall

only be able to buy from people who directly or through multi-lateral trading, will accept in exchange the goods and services which we are able to supply."

The leading article in *The Financial Times*, May 14, contains a further warning (a timely one in view of English losses in the important raw-material areas in Malaya and Burma) that it will be necessary to control industrial imports as well as "luxuries":

"State control must be established to ensure that raw materials are conveyed to the proper channels, and that the country's productive resources are arranged and according to the needs of the foreign and home market, so as to safeguard, as far as possible, the standard of living."

Let us now try to tabulate and summarise these suggestions so as to have some understanding of the "great changes" in industry and of what is meant by the "sacrifices for the sake of exports" which, according to Keynes and the other experts who are planning for the future, will be imposed upon us by the State after the war.

(1) The control exercised at present by the State over the whole of British industry will remain, but as a permanent system. Decisions as to whether a factory shall be set up, and where, and for what kind of production, the granting and sharing of orders—as between the foreign and domestic markets, all this will be under the control of Government Commissions.

(2) Probably a number of old and new industries will be nationalised, but Government Boards will control them all without distinction. Licences will be necessary for buying raw materials and machinery, and the Government will have the power to close down factories or convert them, and to control the Companies' financial policy.

(3) Trading, too, both buying and selling, will cease to be the function of private companies competing one against the other, but will be carried on in combination under the supervision of Government Boards.

(4) It will be necessary for the State to continue its endeavour, by means of income tax, and through indirect methods, as at present, to divert to the service of the State the money savings of the entire population. This will be necessary (1) in order to restrict the purchasing power of the home market, which would otherwise compete with the foreign market, and thus undermine the fundamental policy of the country; (2) in order to enable the State to keep prices low and compete effectively in foreign markets; (3) in order to maintain the armed forces and conscript armies in foreign countries; (4) in order to purchase the materials needed for rebuilding the devastated cities and to buy new plant and establish new factories; (5) in order to buy essential foodstuffs and raw materials and maintain the value of the pound in the United

States of America after the Lease-Lend Agreement has come to an end;

(5) The war-time control of prices, and of the amount of food, clothing and goods of all kinds which the people of Britain are allowed to purchase week by week, will be maintained and intensified. The Minister of Food will remain one of the chief Ministers of the Crown, and coupons and "points" for buying food, clothing and furniture will be a permanent feature of our life. Two things will make this inevitable: first, it will be necessary to restrict food imports because they will have to be paid for by exports; secondly, the kingdom will not be able to follow an advanced and progressive agricultural policy, because the policy of doubling exports will make it essential to be able to offer a wide and stable market to the agricultural countries of America and the Dominions. In a word, in order to "regain our pre-war standard of living," it will be necessary, while the effort lasts, to be satisfied with a standard similar to the war-time standard, or even a lower one. It may prove to be much lower than any one has imagined.

(6) The policy of restoring or doubling exports demands also the retention in the post-war period of the Government's power to send men and women to work wherever the authorities think fit. We know already that the Government intends to maintain conscription after attaining victory. If that victory comes, and if the English Government wishes to remain a Great Power in Europe after the war, the British Army can not be a small one. It may be confidently held, too, that one of the main aims of the Government will be to avoid the growth of unemployment after the war; indeed, the State's financial position will be such that to keep hundreds of thousands on the "dole," as was done in the thirties, will be out of the question. Therefore, with an army demanding the services of a large number of young men and women, with cities and factories waiting to be re-built, and with the necessity to regain foreign markets for the products of new industries, it will be impossible to restore to the workers, or to the young people starting in life, the right to choose their occupation or to decide where they would like to live. The Labour Exchange will retain the present control over their lives, will send them to work where the labour market demands, and in particular will gather the young people together in training camps and in apprentice factories to teach them trade, and thence transfer them to different works and areas as needed. We should not take it for granted, therefore, that the hostels for women and for workers which have been set up in Wales and England during the last two years are a temporary arrangement for the duration of the war, and that when the fighting is over the women and the men will be at liberty to return to their homes and to their old life of freedom. Already the factory temperament and the fac-

tory mind have been created in the women who have been transferred from the Welsh countryside to the munition works and arms factories. They have thus been "conditioned" for an industrial proletarian life. It will not be difficult, therefore, to transfer them to the new export industries, the plans for which are now being drawn out by the Board of Trade's Exports Committee. And since the transition from war to armistice and from armistice to "peace" is gradual, advantage will be taken of the period of transition to establish the new industrial order, and renewed powers will be given to the Ministry of Labour for the new industrial struggle to capture markets for British exports.

There are obvious gaps in the outline given above of the internal results of a vigorous English exports policy after the war. But the kind of society which the policy will create is fairly clear. And it must be understood that the above policy is the only basis generally accepted in England as one on which it is possible to build the society of the future. Can the policy succeed? That, to say the least, is doubtful. Its success depends on a number of conditions outside the control of the English Government; as for instance, the enthusiastic co-operation of foreign countries. A lukewarm co-operation, even on the part of the United States of America, in such a policy, would be almost a miracle, for the success of England in this policy would mean a considerable restriction on the export demands of America herself. But the leaders of England have tied themselves to this policy. It would be useless, just now, to invite the reader to consider what would happen, if it failed. Obviously, it fully deserves Keynes' description to it: "to endure any reasonable sacrifice." Only the adjective is dubious.

But there still remains one question which needs to be faced: What will be the effects of this policy on Wales? And on the Welsh nation?

3.—WALES UNDER THE PLAN.

IT should be understood that our purpose in the last article was not to prophesy the shape of things to come in post-war Wales. Not one of us knows anything at all about the future. We do not know when or where or when the war will end or what troubles will follow it. Our aim was to study the statements made by the Government and its chief advisers of their policy for the period after the war and to deduce therefrom the nature of the conditions that would inevitably arise, assuming that England is victorious, that she adopts the policy and that she pursues it as thoroughly and wholeheartedly as its advocates say she must. And we came to the conclusion that the policy of basing the whole future of Great Britain on the restoration of the leading

position of her exports in the international market would of necessity lead to a totalitarian system, and the continuation of the complete control over our lives, both as communities and individuals, which the State has imposed because of the exigencies of war. Indeed as the struggle for export markets will simply be the continuation of a state of war, it is only fitting that war arrangements should also be continued. It is only fair to admit that the English commentators religiously deny at the moment that "to restore, or double, our exports" means the same thing as "to scramble for markets," and that they eloquently explain that English exports are to be increased with the aim of raising the standard of living in less fortunate countries. Let him believe who can. There is reason to fear that the English apologists take for granted a strange change in human nature, because nothing less than such a miracle can provide a solution for the problem of England's future.

Is there any need to dwell in detail on the effects that a permanent English totalitarian regime will have on the country and nation of Wales? Patriotism can never give up—even under a foreign totalitarianism which is worse than a native totalitarianism. We are, at the present moment living under a totalitarian system. It is not officially designated as such, because it is a system set up to meet the war situation, and therefore we all believe it to be an exceptional and temporary arrangement. But we know already that, even so, it hideously menaces the existence of the Welsh nation, and that even if we do escape from it after the war, the survival of the Welsh nation until then, will be a thing to marvel at. But what if escape proves impossible? What if the system is imposed upon us for a generation, maybe for generations? Is there any hope for the nation should that happen? Can it live? We described in the last article some of the features of the system. Can those co-exist with a distinctive Welsh nation? A *Times* leading article for May 13 says:—

"The industrial as well as the political fortunes of the United Kingdom are indivisible."

There sounds the familiar note of totalitarianism faced with a nation's claims, for the statement occurs in a leading article dealing with Scotland. It is not true; economically and politically the United Kingdom was once not united; and the Act of Union of 1536 was not a marriage sacrament. Let us, however, regard the fact with un-blinkered eyes: if "England and Wales" is an indivisible unit under a permanent totalitarian regime, then the Welsh nation cannot survive, or the Welsh language remain a living tongue, or Welsh life, with its historic institutions and characteristics, continue to exist.

The *Times* article was occasioned by a debate in the House of

Commons on May 12 on post-war reconstruction in Scotland. A whole afternoon was spared by a busy Parliament to discuss the question from Scotland's point of view. All the Scottish M.P.'s declared their resolve that the catastrophes which in Scotland followed the last war should not be repeated after this one. Mr. Maxton, one of the Glasgow M.P.'s, said that all the members representing Scottish constituencies ought to form themselves into a Scottish Advisory Committee for Post-War Reconstruction. Sir S. Chapman argued earnestly for rousing in particular the Scottish Local Authorities to take proper steps without delay to safeguard the existing industries in their areas and to introduce new industries thereto. Mr. Tom Johnston, the Secretary of State for Scotland, went straight from the debate to address the Glasgow Traders' Conference and told them, according to the report in *The Financial Times*, May 16:—

"95 per cent. of the Scottish M.P.'s are determined that Scotland in future plans its own life.

"They are not going to allow the Government's commissioners nor *Gauleiters* to turn the country once more into a depressed area."

Mr. Johnston also made strange and important statements in the House, statements which show him to be an exceptionally independent member of the Government; we quote from the *Times*' synopsis:—

"It is useless to discuss plans for export industries now, until we know how the war will end.

"Therefore he confined his attention to domestic problems and planning, the repopulation of the land, the development of electricity, highland sheep and their farms, hospitals, the development of the highlands and housing schemes."

It is not the object of these notes to demonstrate how mistaken is the export policy of the English Government and its advisers, though we definitely disagree with that policy. We shall content ourselves for the present with quoting, for the sake of the Welsh Socialists, one sentence from Professor O'Rahilly's book on "Money":—"The policy of the Swedish Labour Party is utterly irreconcilable with the dogmatic assertion that the only successful method of increasing the welfare of the working classes and of providing advanced social services is by encouraging the efficient production of a large volume of exports."

What is clear is that we—the nation and country called Wales—are facing a grave peril. We have had fair warning. Mr. Tom Johnston, who is a member of the Government, referred to the danger of the rule of the Commissioners and *Gauleiters* after the war. Scotland is already agitating and planning to prevent her absorption in such a system. And the Secretary for Scotland and other Members who took part in the debate in the House of Commons showed us the way to arm ourselves to withstand the brutal attack. It can be said that three things are necessary:—

(1) The first need is to rouse a national will in Wales. Without the will to remain a nation and to act as a nation we cannot defend any of the things we hold sacred. Every father and mother can see that the tradition of the home and the security of the family are threatened. The conscription of labour, and the right of Labour Exchanges, and of the insolent English officials which direct them, to send our sons and daughters immediately on leaving school to whatever place the State should think fit—these things, after the war is over, would spell tyranny and disruption for our homes, families, neighbour-communities, chapels, churches and all the institutions which together form the Welsh nation. All Wales must make it unmistakably clear that the United Kingdom is not an "indivisible unit." We have always insisted that the nationalism of Wales is a Christian, moderate and conditional Nationalism. And the reply to the policy of "sacrificing for the sake of exports" is that we do not want, and will not allow, our homes, our love of country, the graves of our fathers, the family ties which bind us to our native place, the right of children to grow to maturity in the paths of their fathers, the unity of neighbours found in chapel and church, and its preservation for the future, or any of the things that are essential for a civilized life in Wales, to be sacrificed for the sake of the exports and the standard of living of a great imperial and military power.

(2) The recent Scottish debate, and the leading articles which appeared after it in most of the important English newspapers, demonstrate the immense influence and importance of National Members of Parliament. It is true that the Scottish M.P.'s are not members of the Scottish National Party. Yet (1) it is known that the Nationalist Movement in Scotland is strong, has considerable financial resources, and is able to contest elections and to poll substantially; (2) this in turn has its effect on every party, every parliamentary candidate and every M.P. in Scotland, so that they are effective Nationalists in economic matters; in the words of the Secretary for Scotland, "95 per cent. of the Scottish M.P.'s are determined that Scotland in future plans its own life"; from this position to a demand later on that Scotland should have a Parliament and Government of her own, is but a small step. The point we now wish to stress is the importance of members of Parliament. The Scottish Members by their co-operation and their unanimous stand for Scottish rights, can strongly influence the plans of English Government. A better example of what an united band of M.P.'s can achieve has not been seen for some time, and the Scottish Members are far from being a National Party, like that of the Irish Members under Parnell. They have proved however that it is an immense advantage, indeed, an indispensable advantage, for a country and nation in this realm under the present system to possess a body of vigorous and united

Parliamentary representatives, imbued with the national spirit. Wales must learn this lesson. Her fear of the Welsh Nationalist Movement must be changed to enthusiasm, affection and support, so that to the first Parliament after the war, there may be returned a real Welsh Party. Lacking this, it is impossible to put up an effective fight for Wales. Lacking this Welsh homes and Welsh lands cannot be protected from depredation. The families of Wales can no longer afford members of Parliament who are un-Welsh. Their freedom is in the balance, and the hope of their sons and daughters. The essentials of Welsh life cannot be peacefully defended without a Welsh National Party in the House of Commons.

(3) The Scottish debate made evident the importance of the local authorities, and their responsibility for planning for the economic future of their areas. This is no new thing. But for the post-war period we see the need of new blood and new energy if local government is to be saved for the service of Wales. The fact is that the whole system is under condemnation. In important circles its abolition is spoken of as inevitable. The local authorities are too poor, their sphere of service too limited, their resources too small, their boundaries too unscientific to allow of their being useful units for their purpose. They must be done away with, and "regions"—wide areas with mixed and varied economic resources—formed to take their place. The fact that local government elections have been suspended for the duration, and the functions of the authorities to a great extent placed in the hands of their chief paid officials, has helped to hasten the dissolution of the local government system. It will be an easy matter for the Government after the war to arrange its burial and set up a new system in its stead.

If that happened, its effect would be to destroy the spirit of responsibility. Large administrative regions cannot be created without finally destroying what still remains of local patriotism and transferring all real power and all responsibility to the officials, the Commissioner and the *Gauleiter*. That a local authority is poor is not a good reason why it should be abolished. The parish was not recognised as an administrative council or meeting because it was a wealthy economic unit. The first and foremost reason for its recognition was that the parish was a natural community, a group of neighbours who joined together to perform the most important of social acts, namely the worship of God; all other duties grew from this. Not less, but more, of true local authority, is the real need in Wales. What is wanted is not the abolition of the poorer authorities and their absorption in bureaucratic regions, but the awakening of a new interest in them and the removal of all obstacles that prevent local leaders from being brought into their service. Then the problem of their poverty,

their inability to pay for the services of first-rate experts and their lack of resources should be overcome by urging upon them orderly schemes of co-operation. We have shown in other articles how this may be done. We pleaded, years before the war, for effective co-operation between the Welsh local authorities for the re-building of the economic life and the cultural life of the country. By now the authorities themselves are threatened with extinction. Their only hope is to co-operate and to tackle with determination the problem of their own reform. A few bureaucratic regions would be more convenient for a totalitarian state. But a free nation is a "community of communities" and now is the time for small communities to unite in a co-operative system to maintain freedom. For freedom is a local thing: it is in his home that a man is free. The business of nationalism is to foster homes.

It is our contention that we can begin now to build a wall of defence for Wales lest she be overwhelmed by the unchecked onrush of English totalitarianism after the war, and that the essential elements in such a defence are a vigorous national life, an independent Welsh party in the House of Commons and the revival and reform of the Welsh local authorities. If these three things are secured, then a fourth essential will also be forthcoming, namely intelligent and prudent planning for the future, which will also be effective planning. For it is when the weaker bodies lose heart and shirk their responsibility that the State becomes a totalitarian monster. It was when South Wales authorities before the war declared that the care of the poverty-stricken unemployed workers was not their business that the State laid hands on those workers to transfer them like sheep to foreign areas in England. The force of appeal of English totalitarianism after the war lies in the claim of the State and its experts that they, after a period of "sacrifice," will ultimately be able to restore the standard of living in England to its former level and conquer the black problem of unemployment. It is of importance to remember that the standard of living in the inter-war period (1919-1939) was not nearly as high in Wales as in England. So low was it, as a general rule, in the agricultural areas and in the districts where unemployment prevailed, that Wales fears future poverty to a much smaller degree than do most parts of England. And Wales is able with much greater calm to face the truth; which is that after this war, with its wastefulness and losses, prosperity cannot speedily be restored. Wales, moreover, must realise that her situation differs in two important particulars from that of England.

The difference, familiar enough to every student, can be summarised as follows:—

(1) The whole industrial life of Wales has been organised for the export market; a very few heavy industries were concentrated

upon, i.e., the very industries for the product of which the market is now very limited, and which can no longer support a large population or hope for expansion.

(2) These industries also lack a home market; they have not around them a variety of light subsidiary industries on which to lean, neither have they an overhead market in England.

It can be added:

(3) That Wales lacks experience and technical skill in regard to light industries and

(4) That the prejudice against South Wales as an area in which to set up new industries is likely to survive this war among English industrial chiefs and Government advisers.

In view of these facts, those who are drawing up plans for Wales—voluntary bodies such as the Welsh Survey Board—would do well to give consideration to the advice and plan of Mr. Johnston, the Secretary for Scotland, which we have already quoted. We do not know how the war will end. It is idle now to lay ambitious plans in regard to the export industries. But to plan for a much more self-supporting economic life than Wales has known for a century—that is a practical proposition. That means building a new Welsh economic system. There are four fields on which we would do well to concentrate our planning: first, agriculture and its dependent industries; secondly, the development of a system of electricity for Wales—this is exceptionally important in order to facilitate the establishment of small industries and village industries; thirdly, the erection of new houses, villages and towns throughout the length and breadth of Wales; and fourthly, the setting up for Wales of a satisfactory medical system and adequate hospitals. These are the matters on which committees of experts can begin at once to work in detail, drawing out ten year plans for putting the schemes into practice. The slate industry, in particular, should begin now a study of Welsh slate resources and how to develop them, and also to draw up an apprenticeship system for the post-war period, so as to be ready to grasp its opportunity. It is our conviction that in planning in this way, chiefly for a Welsh market, secondly for an English market, and thirdly for a foreign market, lies our best hope of saving Wales from extinction.

4.—THE LESSONS OF THE DEPRESSED AREAS.

IT is by no means too soon for us to face one likely consequence of the war, namely its effects on the economic life of Wales. The sooner we apply our minds to this subject, the better. For it

demand a change of mind, and mind-changing is not an easy task. It is not too early for us to start on the stern discipline of changing the mind of Wales, and especially of South Wales, where the greater part of our population is concentrated. The last war dealt a mortal blow to the heavy industries of Wales. Is it not crystal clear that this war will complete the process? Whatever else results from the war, the share of Wales' heavy industries in the world's markets will be very much smaller than in pre-war days. Compared with that of the past, it will be unimportant. It will, moreover, be unimportant in the economic life of future Wales. It reached its peak in 1880. Thereafter until the last war it had a downward trend. It declined rapidly from 1925—1939. Now a period has come to an end.

We should be thankful that the situation we are now facing is neither new nor unexpected. It is merely the culminating phase of a slow process, Wales' part in the world-revolution which broke out in the explosion of 1914 and which is now in progress. This gives us notable advantages. We have already had twenty years to face the problem. We have also had twenty years bitter experience of refusal to face the problem. The Labour Party in South Wales said, "We are governed from Westminster, and unemployment is a matter for the Government." And Mr. Malcolm Stewart, the first Commissioner for the Depressed Areas, said in the same year:

"In these areas there is too little of the spirit of self-reliance and effort, and too much tendency to consider that the future of the areas is a matter for the Government."

We have experienced the effects of this attitude, too. Because the leaders of South Wales refused the responsibility and cast it on the Government, the Government initiated the policy of dispersing the Welsh population and transferring the youth to be scattered far and wide in industrial districts in England. And bitter as this was for Welsh families, no protest or rebellion was possible, since the leaders of public life and local authorities of Wales had disclaimed all responsibility and declined to plan themselves or accept the plans of others.

No, the situation in its essence is not new, but one of which our experience is sufficient to make us dread it. Neither, to be sure, will it be exactly the same situation as existed before 1939. It will be worse in many ways. It will be more difficult, more perplexing and more complex. We do not claim ability to foresee all the new complexities or to imagine what kind of world lies before us. But we can venture to suggest one factor that will add to the complexity of the post-war problem. In 1931 and the year following, the English Government could at least adopt extensively the policy of transferring the young population of Wales into England. That solution will not again be feasible. For the

English industrial areas will themselves be in similar difficulties. And therefore if Wales the next time is unable to shift for herself, there will be for her no possible way of escape from the slavery of totalitarian government, from the military conscription of youth, and from compulsory industrial service in lieu of the dole. If Wales again after this war shirks the responsibility, she will have no choice left but bloody chaos on the one hand or ruthless slavery on the other.

When the unemployment crisis was at its worst in Wales in 1931—35, two plans for recovery were put before the country, one by the Welsh Nationalist Party (in the English pamphlet on 'Local Authorities and Welsh Industries') and the other by Mr. Malcolm Stewart, the Commissioner for Special Areas appointed by the Government's Ministry of Labour. The Commissioner's plan was the later of the two in point of time, but it is noteworthy that the principles underlying Mr. Stewart's first report were precisely those which formed the basis of the earlier plan. Now it will not be unuseful to turn to Mr. Malcolm Stewart's report and examine the principles which he suggested for Wales in 1935, to see whether they can give us guidance, when we face once more, as we inevitably must, the problem of re-organising the economic life of our country. It will be worth our while to quote at some length from Mr. Stewart's report, and then to analyse his recommendations. They can be seen in paragraphs 200—206 of his official report in 1935, the heading of the Section being "Where Hope Lies."

Mr. Stewart's task was to consider the problem of South Wales as a "Special Area" and his earnest enquiry was: In what direction shall we look for trade revival, and how shall we begin?

"Throughout the areas the cry is for work; this can only be satisfied by the creation of production, and by the expansion of industry. Manufacturers are not prepared to take the risk of the disadvantages they rightly or wrongly associate with the Areas. How can the Areas attract trade instead of repelling it? I can see but one way out and that is to create a local demand for local production. If critics say that this proposal is impracticable, I shall not be impressed. Whatever the theoretical objections to thus expanding industry within the Areas, once a practical start is made, outside capital and enterprise will be attracted. The foundation of the proposal lies in the fact that these Areas still have a considerable population with a powerful, if diminished, spending power. They have in their own hands a lever which can be applied to create a market for locally produced goods. It can be used to dislodge distress if sufficient energy and courage are displayed in the right way."

So reads paragraph 201 of Mr. Stewart's report, in which the principle is concisely stated. The report goes on to demonstrate, by reference to the history of the areas, that the principle is consistent with their old traditions in the time of their former pros-

perity, and that the only thing they need is courage for new enterprises.

"The loss of turnover in the heavy industries must be made good by the expansion of the light industries and by the production of every local need. If success for the proposal is to be secured, it is essential that the wholehearted support of the inhabitants should be shown practically. They must purchase from those taking the risk of producing for their requirements. A crusade is needed to make all inhabitants of these Areas feel it is their bounden duty to support local industries, which must be assured of a market. Let us assume an increased spirit of enterprise and the determination to pull through. How shall a start be made? Effective representative leadership must be secured, leadership which will invoke enthusiasm. Industrialists, trade unions and the Churches must get to work; each must play his part. There must be created a nucleus of power and influence to plan, to organise and, above all, to give confidence; for this last, there is the greatest need. A campaign must be instituted to make every man and woman feel that they are essential to the success of the scheme and are neglecting their duty if they do not buy locally. Pledges must be obtained and a feeling created that every purchase of locally produced goods, however small, brings relief to distress."

These are the words of Mr. Malcolm Stewart, a leading business man, invited by the English Government to become adviser and first commissioner for the Distressed Areas in 1934, and it will be seen that he was speaking to South Wales in precisely the same terms as the Welsh Nationalist Party were using at that time. He was not listened to then. After the war, his message will have to be listened to. And perhaps a brief analysis of his proposals will help to explain why his suggestions were not acted upon in 1935, and in that way show how they may be put into practice when the next opportunity comes.

1. The basic principle of Mr. Stewart's message for South Wales in 1935 was this: You have lost your foreign markets for the products of your heavy industries. You have still a large population in your area. These people have a great many daily necessities which they must buy. Set to work, therefore, to produce these things which they purchase. Establish factories to make them. The natural right to that market—your own people—is yours.

This point merits one or two comments:

(a) It denies the validity of the principle of *laissez faire* and Free Trade by which the natural right to the market, wherever the latter may be, belongs to the person who sells at the lowest price.

(b) It sets moral principle above the doctrines of the economics of competition. It is not the Economic Man that we have here set before us, but a community of neighbours united by an organic relationship, with mutual claims and obligations, having a duty

of brotherhood, and a responsibility to create a full social life within their community's bounds for the sake of the physical and spiritual health of the community as a whole.

2. Mr. Stewart's second point is that a Committee or Council is needed to guide, arrange and plan a policy and programme on the principle of the co-operation of an organic community striving to emerge from economic bankruptcy. Be it remembered that the commissioner's charge was to advise Special Areas—economically distressed districts in England as well as Wales. It was not a nation or country that was entrusted to his care,—though he did remark on the strong national sentiment in the Special Area of South Wales. He could not, therefore, in 1935 urge the claims of a Government as the proper body to undertake the great task which he was proposing. But he realised the necessity, even in a Special Area, of a group of courageous, enterprising, level-headed, resolute leaders, trusted (above all) by the people—to make the scheme a success, and to turn it into a practical programme.

On this point we shall here make only two comments:

(a) After the war, we shall, in Wales, be facing the problem not of a "Special Area" but of a nation; and what Mr. Stewart declared to be indispensable for a Special Area, is far more indispensable for the Welsh nation.

(b) Expressed in plain terms, Mr. Stewart's policy for the Special Area was one of moderate, reasonable and cautious self-sufficiency. Mr. Stewart saw the point, which has since been effectively argued in an important recent English pamphlet, "A Twentieth Century Economic System":

"A 'Distressed Area' is one which is obliged to 'import' from the rest of the country but is not able to produce enough to pay for those 'imports' with 'exports' to the rest of the country. The result is that money is sucked out of the area."

Since a special area cannot raise tariffs or quotas, and cannot regulate imports, Mr. Stewart had but one essential advice for overcoming the difficulty, and this forms the third indispensable step in his plan.

3. You must, said Mr. Stewart, at once start a crusade—a Christian term deliberately chosen—

"To make every man and woman feel that they are essential to the success of the scheme and are neglecting their duty if they do not buy locally."

That is, you must create in the community—Mr. Stewart had in mind the South Wales Special Area—such a sense of unity, such *esprit-de-corps*, that the people will refuse to buy goods from outside, if locally-made goods are available, even if the price of the "imported" articles be lower. That is you must teach all your people to act as though they themselves were a government, and

place an embargo on imports, so as to restore prosperity to the community and prevent its devastation. That was the Crusade, and Mr. Stewart called upon trades unions, industrial magnates, local leaders, and in particular the Christian Churches, to enter into the campaign, to teach the people and guide them from the valley of depression into the sunshine of economic activity and useful work and a life of service.

Why did the plan fail?

To be fair, 'failure' is not the right word. Mr. Stewart's suggestion did not fail; they fell upon stoney ground. Important as they were, South Wales made no effort to test them or put them into practice. They were, admittedly more sweeping and extreme, less gradual and conservative than the plan outlined in the pamphlet, "Local Authorities and Welsh Industries." On the other hand, they had the name and prestige of a Government Commissioner behind them; and yet, in spite of all this, they were not once put to the test. It is well to ask, why? For the answer will help us to aim better, if we are given a second chance after the war.

1. First, lack of leadership. The depressed districts of South Wales had no leaders with the courage, strength and spirit demanded by Mr. Stewart's proposals. They were not to be found among industrial chiefs, the Trades Unions, or in the Local Authorities. The shirking of responsibility, the refusal to lead—these were the distinguishing characteristics of the Welsh leaders. In their opinion, every act of responsible leadership was a matter for the Government.

2. Secondly, Mr. Stewart did not sufficiently consider the question of the crusade to instruct the people in their social duties. The creation of an effective social will in Wales is not a task to be quickly accomplished, for it demands the undoing of three centuries of education in treachery and servility. A momentary ardour will not suffice—it cannot create an indomitable will. This can only be achieved by an arduous process of education, based on the community's past. Now a Special Area is not a natural unit. A nation is a natural unit. A nation has a past, a history peculiar to itself. On this an education can be built. The classic example of a nation taught to co-operate economically in order to overcome industrial depression, is found in the story of Bishop Grundtvig and Denmark. It was on the language, traditions, history, folk-lore and songs of Denmark that Grundtvig rebuilt the economic life of his people in the dark hour of their defeat by Germany. There is for Wales no other way of salvation. Wise and enterprising planning is essential. But, without educating the nation, it would prove futile. It is high time we began. Not a day can we afford to lose. The patriots and Nationalists of Wales must teach the youth wherever opportunity offers. The local authorities, too, must be won over. That done, it will not

be difficult to win the school-teachers. But lacking this, our talk of creating a spirit of responsibility in Wales, and of rousing the people to their duty of helping to resolve the economic health of Wales, will be vain and foolish. Such are the lessons of Mr. Malcolm Stewart's failure. Wales' educational system must now start on a new course, and make Welsh history and culture the foundation of her children's education.

5.—ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION.

WE have placed before the reader the proposals made in 1935 by the first Commissioner for Special (Depressed) Areas for the economic recovery of those areas. We have attempted to analyse the proposals and to understand their content and full implications. And our suggestion is this:—that the economic position of Wales as a whole after this war will be such that it would be useful to consider whether the principles underlying Mr. Malcolm Stewart's proposals for the Special Areas in 1935 can be adapted to form the basis of a plan for Wales when the present war is over. For that purpose a fairly detailed study has been made in these pages of the implications of Mr. Stewart's proposals. We have tried to show why his advice was not acted upon, and why his important recommendations proved fruitless. In the notes that follow, we shall try to suggest means whereby Mr. Stewart's principles may be applied to Wales when we are called upon as a nation to face the responsibility of organising normal life after the war.

Mr. Malcolm Stewart maintained that his plan required a Committee or Council to lead and formulate a programme on the principle of social co-operation, and emphasised the need that such a council must consist of bold, resolute, brave, whole-hearted men, commanding in a special degree their people's trust, so that where they lead the people would follow.

On no other condition could the special Areas be restored to prosperity. If this was necessary in the case of the Special Areas it is clear that it will be absolutely essential for the social and economic re-organisation of Wales as a whole. Indeed, from our point of view, the task of Welsh recovery and reconstruction would be far easier if after the war we had a Welsh Government. Short of world revolution, however, that will not be an immediate feature of the post-war situation. But on the other hand we have no right to disclaim responsibility for the problem until we are given the powers of Government. It is our constant duty as Welsh Nationalists to do our utmost for our country in the existing circumstances, as well as to show her that freedom and self-government are necessary for her well-being. Let us therefore,

consider what central body there may be in Wales before the end of the war, to which she may look for leadership in economic reconstruction. We must make the best of what lies to our hand.

It seems that there are three bodies in existence whose claims and qualifications for this work may be considered.

First of all the Welsh M.P.'s have asked the Government to establish an advisory Council for Wales for the express purpose of post-war re-organisation, and recently there was published a list of names which it is said the M.P.'s are placing before the Government as persons qualified for the task.

Now, the Welsh M.P.'s have our full support in their effort to persuade the Government to grant an Advisory Council to Wales, as distinct from England. We believe too that such a Council, if established, could fulfil a not unuseful function, and that in particular it could prevent the Government from doing any gratuitous injury to Wales. Indeed its purpose would be a preventive and advisory one—to act as a brake on Whitehall bureaucracy which is so utterly ignorant of, and indifferent to, Welsh affairs. This Council however could not do the work required of it by the plan of Welsh reconstruction, which we are now discussing, for the Council's responsibility will be to the Government. It can only act as the Government requires and give advice to the different Government Departments. The present proposals demand a central body which will guide public opinion, and stand freely and independently for plans of Welsh reconstruction.

The second claimant is the Welsh National Development Council. It will be remembered that this organisation grew out of the South Wales and Monmouthshire Development Council, and that it was the Welsh Nationalists who pleaded for enlarging the latter into a national body representing and consisting of the leading Welsh Local Authorities (see 'The Case for a Welsh National Development Council'), which would formulate plans for Wales as a whole.

It is not necessary to repent of, or apologise for, the proposal. It has still possibilities of much good. But we must face the truth: this Council as yet, has not contributed anything of importance to the economic recovery of South Wales in the pre-war period nor anything of value to social and economic thought in Wales. The value of the Development Council lies in its being a kind of framework for a national economic organisation uniting within itself the Welsh Local Authorities. But in this, too, lies the cause of its ineffectiveness; for the leaders of the Welsh Local Authorities were the very people who in the pre-war period disclaimed responsibility for Welsh reconstruction. None of them had energy, vision, courage to plan boldly—none had the will for

it. Welsh life has no more melancholy sight than that presented by the majority of its local authorities. National leadership is the last thing to be expected of the Welsh Local Authorities at the present time, or of the Welsh National Development Council in its present form.

What about the voluntary national organisations? Two bodies exist which can be mentioned in this category. Undeb Cymru Fydd and the Welsh Survey Board. The first is taking a prominent and energetic part in the public life of Wales. It exists primarily to guard and guide the Welsh Nation's cultural and spiritual life during the war, and to protect the Nation's spiritual and social interests from the dangers arising from wartime arrangements. It is Welsh in language as well as spirit; its influence and importance cannot be denied; propaganda for Wales and Welsh traditions, and care for Welsh rural life are its main field of activity. The second is a body of investigators, as yet working privately, under the chairmanship of Sir Percy Watkins, on the problems of social and economic reorganisation in post-war Wales. It is not in any way a public body, nor does it claim to represent anyone; but it studies the question of reorganisation so as to be able to assist authoritative bodies should the need arise, and its work has scarcely begun. It has among its members experts in various fields.

These two bodies have two things in common—a spontaneous enthusiasm on behalf of the nation, and a readiness to work in its interests without remuneration and without thanks. It is either Patriotism, or Christian Welsh Nationalism, which is their inspiration and motive. But neither of them has an official standing or representative part in administrative life of Wales. They are therefore more responsible and willing to give the nation a lead, and they do so freely and independently.

You now perceive the problem, and its extreme importance. As the last article explained, Mr. Malcolm Stewart's plan in 1933 really demanded a national awakening to make it effective for the Welsh depressed areas. But it also demanded a central body, possessing **authority to give a lead**. The necessity for these things in the work of economic and social reconstruction after this war will be much greater still. Without a Welsh national renaissance nothing can be done. The most expert planning will be valueless, unless we can rouse the nation's will to maintain itself as a Welsh and traditionally community. We would impress this on all who are interested in the problem. We shall ignore an essential part of the problem if we confine ourselves to abstract planning without also rousing the national will to effective action. This will be a heavy task. Nor can we hope to succeed, except on one condition, namely, that the leaders of the Voluntary Or-

ganisations shall first proclaim unequivocally their adherence to the principle of nationhood, placing it before all other political ties, and urging the whole Welsh nation to follow their example. Thus only will a public opinion be created in Wales which will also be a national will. Without this all planning will be dilatory and vain.

As a next step the propaganda of the Voluntary Organisations must win over the Local Authorities or the Welsh National Development Council, and so combine the representative national element in the latter with the definite lead found in the voluntary bodies. That is the only constitutional, peaceful and democratic means of achieving recovery. Thus only will it be possible to give a lead to Wales and to speak authoritatively on behalf of Wales to the Government. After prolonged consideration of this matter it is our conviction that this method is our only alternative if we are not to let things drift either to the extinction of Wales or to revolution and anarchy.

Again, to win over the Local Authorities is essential in order to initiate a co-operative scheme of production—which was Malcolm Stewart's basic proposal. Mr. Stewart repeatedly stressed that the depressed areas should bear in mind that they had still a large amount of money to spend, that almost all this money was going out of the depressed districts to pay other areas for producing goods for them, and that this state of things should be changed by producing at home in the depressed areas themselves all those goods that could be produced locally and for which there was a local demand. In that way only, said Mr. Stewart, could a variety of light industries be set up in distressed areas.

Now consider: Who in Wales today (apart from Government offices) spend the largest sums of money? The answer is: the Local Authorities. We said in 1933: "We suggest that the Welsh National Development Council should set up a research committee to report on the sources of the various materials supplied to all the spending departments of Welsh Local Governments."

"If in this report it were shown that only a portion of such materials is supplied by Welsh firms and that many of these materials cannot at present by any means be purchased in Wales, then we have discovered a market (1) which the Welsh people would have an undeniable right to capture and monopolise; (2) which would warrant the raising of plant to supply materials now purchased from outside Wales."

Then we went on to outline a plan whereby co-operative factories could be set up by the Welsh Local Authorities. The plan can be read in the English pamphlet, "Local Authorities and Welsh Industry," or in the Welsh volume, "Canlyn Arthur." The point we wish to stress here is that only through effective action on the

part of the local authorities can Wales after the war initiate the policy of setting up a variety of light industries on the principle suggested by Mr. Malcolm Stewart.

We doubt whether there be another method of putting Mr. Stewart's proposals into practice which can be shown to be as safe and as economical as the one outlined above. He asked for a crusade to induce every individual to undertake not to buy any but local products, where these were available. Thus only could there be obtained a market for these goods, secure against the competition of large factories. But such a policy demands a heroic standard of morality and social responsibility from ordinary men and women. If, however, a lead was given by the local authorities, if the advantage of this plan were made apparent in action, if the social benefits thus brought about were once seen, the example would be a much more effective means of persuasion than any amount of verbal propaganda. In a short time, the Welsh co-operative societies could be persuaded to follow the lead of the local authorities. The independent shopkeepers could be induced to follow. But the first essential is to get the local authorities to establish their co-operative Public Utility Board. There is the foundation on which to build a system of new light industries for Wales after the war.

Be it noticed: We are not calling upon the local authorities of Wales, the county councils for instance, to set up their own factories; for each to do so would be costly and wasteful. We are calling upon them to become members of independent co-operative Boards, which will establish their factories to supply the regular yearly demands of all the authorities which become members. And the co-operation should be adaptable and not rigid. Take for instance the education authorities, and the schools in Wales. Each year they have need of thousands of writing books of all kinds, and a large amount of other materials, of furniture, such as desks and blackboards. We venture to say that by far the larger proportion of all these are purchased outside Wales. They could, and ought to be, purchased in Wales. If there be not in the Principality a firm of school-furniture makers there is the opportunity to set up a factory by a Co-operative Board of Local Authorities—and it will be the task of the Central Body to draw up the necessary Parliamentary Bill enabling the authorities to set up their Board. But there is no need for the method to be identical in each individual instance. There are paper-makers in Wales; the Central Body could in the name of the Local Authorities secure regular orders for the factories already in existence, and consult with these as to methods of raising new machinery, extending the works, or taking in new workmen for training in order to meet the demand. It will be the responsibility

of the Central Body (whether it be a reorganised National Development Council or some other similar organisation) to arrange a programme of development, and to keep a staff of experts to work out the technical details of the measures to be taken. This Council, as we visualise it, would be a kind of economic parliament of the Welsh Local Authorities, uniting them in co-operative activity. We believe this to be a far better plan than the common one by which it proposed to scrap the present authorities and create two or three regional authorities for the whole of Wales. That would mean the centralisation of authority in a stronger entrenched bureaucracy. Our principle is to distribute authority and keep alive the local bodies, but also to give them force, power, and efficiency by national and united co-operation. We have now under discussion one aspect only of the problem of post war reconstruction, namely, how to go about setting up of light industries in Wales to take the place of heavy industries, for the return of which there is no longer any hope, and by so doing to obtain for our people work and a full life, and ensure for the Welsh Community a variety of trades which will enrich and humanise its spirit. This is a programme for the period after the war. But it should be obvious that now is the time to prepare for it, and to formulate the plans clearly and educate the country in the principle. What then is the work that should be tackled at once?

(1) First the Welsh Survey Board in co-operation with Undeb Cymru Fydd should undertake the work we suggested in 1933 to be done by the National Development Council—that is, to obtain from the chief local authorities an account of their main items of expenditure for all their administrative and constructive departments, and then to prepare a detailed programme of possible developments in regard to small factories to supply these regular demands. This is no small or unimportant task. It will require much research and much consultation with specialists, and with the chief administrative officials of the local authorities and with industrial experts in Wales.

(2) Then a survey should be made of the present resources of Wales to meet the demands. This will not be so difficult, but the research must be thorough so that afterwards definite proposals, calculated to win their attention and their co-operation, may be made to the local authorities and to other public bodies (e.g. hospitals).

(3) The survey board should also set up a special committee having among its members experienced architects and technical experts, to consider the location of the new light industries in Wales. These need not all be established in the industrial valleys of the South. It is important to reverse the order in Wales,

and to attract the population from the industrial valleys, now derelict, to other parts of Wales. That is what we mean when we talk of de-industrialising South Wales,—i.e. the restoration of balance in the distribution of the population over the whole country. At present too many people are crowded in too small a space in many parts of the South, while Mid-Wales and the agricultural districts are too thinly populated. Wales should be humanised by arranging a balanced distribution of the people, and this can be achieved by wisely locating the light industries.

(4) But we stress once more the fundamental truth that this programme's success depends ultimately on the awakening of the Nation, the gwerin of Wales, to "will" its own salvation. We cannot do without the brain-work, the consultative committee, the expert advisers. But without courage to believe in the nation, without the common people's faith, without winning their confidence in a clear cut Welsh lead—all efforts will prove fruitless. Propaganda (in the good meaning of the word) will be essential. That means that leaders and planners will possess conviction. Welsh Nationalists are eager to co-operate with all who are honestly seeking the good of Wales. We do not ask them to join the Nationalist Party, or to accept Dominion Status as their aim, before we will give them our co-operation. What we do ask is that they shall publicly and unequivocally assert their belief that Wales is a Nation, and that she has the right to order her own life and to protect that life, and that they shall consider all other political matters as being secondary to this and as being of no account in comparison with this.